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editorial: end of social democracy?
Looking around Europe in 2018, one could easily find supporting evidence for the 
demise of the moderate political left: the collapse of the Socialist Party in France, 
devastating election results in the Netherlands, agonizing arguments in the German 
SPD, instances of utter political corruption in Slovakia and neighbouring post-com-
munist countries, and as rays of hope appear ex-communist Syriza, old-fashioned 
Trotskyistic entrism in the UK. Ex-chancellors as moneymakers and parties from 
former colonies in the Socialist International that could not be called democratic 
round out the portrait of a movement under strain.
However, when we started working on the call for papers for the present vol-
ume, several of the abovementioned incidents had not yet occurred. The present 
issue does not aim to offer commentaries on the most recent developments in poli-
tics in Europe, but seeks to open minds both geographically and temporally. Social 
democracy is old enough to have gone through more than one crisis and it is not our 
intention to depict the current troubles as the final crisis before its complete collapse.
In its 150-plus-year history, social democracy has experienced more than one set 
of threatening circumstances. In 1914, internationalism collapsed in the face of rag-
ing nationalistic moods and policies; after the end of the Great War, the schism of 
communism established a new cleavage for the forthcoming decades. Grilled by the 
Third International on the one hand and the rising anti-democratic fascist move-
ments on the other, interwar social democracy lost its appeal to the masses. The 
inability of the labour movement to establish showpieces of democratic socialism 
beyond the municipal level (e.g. Red Vienna) weakened the interwar 2 ½ Interna-
tional. After the end of the Second World War, the short-lived existence of social 
democratic parties east of the Elbe came to an end when Stalinism’s one party policy 
swallowed them up. From 1917 to 1989, social democrats again had to fight a two-
front campaign and only when they voted for an armistice with so-called capital-
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ism did they start to win elections. The four decades coinciding with what has been 
called the Cold War became the moderate left’s period of their greatest success. 
In postwar Europe, social democracy is associated with democratization, the 
welfare state, educational expansion and liberal judiciary reforms. As a common fea-
ture of the moderate left, the various national flavours of social democracy (as will 
also be demonstrated by the contributions to this volume) share the aim of secur-
ing social progress within a democratic society,1 as opposed to communism and 
Soviet authoritarianism. This stance still acknowledged the experience of persecu-
tion, incarceration, and resistance under Nazi and Fascist regimes in Europe, which 
the social democrats shared with the communists and other political orientations. 
For some decades, leading figures from the moderate left could refer to this heroic 
past and defend their moral supremacy. The next generations of leaders lacked any 
comparable heroism. Admiration for particular instances of political activism went 
elsewhere: Movements under the banners of antiwar, feminism, environmentalism, 
development aid and quite recently refugee help did not come into being in the 
milieus of the moderate left. Social democratic parties became innovation followers 
instead of frontrunners of social betterment.
Echoing earlier phases of socialist internationalism, many a left-wing thinker 
(whether moderate or more radical) had one central plan for the time after the Sec-
ond World War: building a new and better Europe. Some actually gave voice to ideas 
that had been around at least since 1925. In 1941, Altiero Spinelli (an Italian Com-
munist who was later European Commissioner, and a Member of the European Par-
liament) and Eugenio Colorni (an Italian scholar and resistance fighter who was 
killed by the Fascists in 1944), both prisoners of Mussolini on the island of Vento-
tene, sketched a plan of a European Federation based on a socialist revolution. For 
them it was evident that capitalism and its crises had led to Fascism and the Sec-
ond World War, and thus nationalism in Europe had to be eradicated by a Euro-
pean Federation in which “[p]rivate property must be abolished, limited, corrected, 
extended: instance by instance, however, not dogmatically according to principle.”2 
Interestingly enough, the Heidelberg party programme of the SPD in 1925 claimed 
that the SPD as a member of the socialist labour international would fight Fascism 
and Imperialism by erecting a unified European economy under the auspices of the 
United States of Europe.3
Internationalism as a cornerstone of socialism had manifested itself as Europe-
anization in the moderate left parties after 1945. But even in such a field tradition-
ally occupied by the left, the social democrats very often demonstrated ambiguous 
stances because of the need to defend their social base against competitors from 
abroad. Open borders undermine the negotiation power of trade unions for higher 
salaries of the masses. Brexit was at least to some degree the answer to over 10 years 
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of an open labour market for citizens of new EU member states. Faced with simi-
lar economic and social challenges, the various national European social democratic 
parties practised a lively exchange, which is also reflected in the contributions to 
the present issue. Some of these parties soon became beacons and many a strategic 
debate referred to the deeds, successes or failures of a European sister party. 
The expansion of the welfare state, and the tremendous increase in income that 
went with it, along with the social security of an expanding economy, induced Ger-
man sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf to call the 20th century the social democratic era.4 
However, social democracy in Europe after 1945 has also been associated with 
Dahrendorf ’s dictum of social democracy falling prey to its own success: because 
social progress led to changes in social structure, the upward mobility of the work-
ing class to the lower middle classes (particularly in relation to skilled labour and 
public services) caused the working class electorate to almost vanish.
Most probably, Dahrendorf too must have been surprised to see a blossoming 
time for social democracy immediately after the publication of his book-length 
statement. After the implosion of communism east of the Elbe, the majority of the 
declining state parties became born-again social democrats (at least in name). In the 
West, in a kind of non-simultaneity, the implosion of communism was accompa-
nied by the flourishing of the moderate left-wing governments in the US under the 
Clinton administration from 1993, in the UK under Blair from 1997, and in Ger-
many under Schröder from 1998. They adapted the label New Labour (which was 
a party conference slogan in 1994 and the title of a manifesto in 1996) in order to 
pursue a so-called Third Way (launched by Clinton and Blair in 1998 in New York) 
“[b]eyond Left and Right” (Giddens 1994). The very same slogans that earned those 
Third Wayers acclaim in the bourgeois press contributed to their defeat at the ballot 
box: in Spain in 1996, in the US in 2000, in Germany in 2005, and in the UK in 2010.
Moreover, these European social democratic parties also compromised them-
selves in various welfare retrenchment policy reforms (Blair’s “welfare to work”, 
Clinton’s “end welfare as we know it”, Schröder’s Agenda 2010 etc.) and the conti-
nental Social Democrats today are faced with the threat of extinction due to a per-
ceived loss of their distinct political profile in coalition governments, and conse-
quently a loss of working class voters due to the rise of (right-wing) populist parties. 
At present, the German populist party AfD has a higher percentage of working class 
voters than the SPD.5
This brief survey of the parties’ histories could easily be expanded to other 
domains, but first we should recognize that the sketch shows something else, too. 
The ups and downs in parliamentary representation of the social democratic parties 
do not fit a simple model of expansion, contraction or cycles. In party politics, the 
moderate left is still around, not always running under the name “social democrat”, 
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and some parties campaigning under this label lack serious references to the tradi-
tion of August Bebel, Victor Adler and other undisputed heroes of the past.
The trajectory of the moderate left in (Western) Europe could also be seen as 
the longevity of its oligarchical structure. When the German labour movement 
reached its first peak in the early 20th century, a then young comrade and sociolo-
gist became famous for pointing to undemocratic patterns within the SPD: Robert 
Michels argued that a movement that preached democracy lacked mechanisms of 
democratic representation. His “iron law of oligarchy” claims that “the dominion of 
the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates 
over the delegators” characterizes such organisations.6
Over a century has passed since Michels proposed this mechanism, and it would 
make a nice exercise to prove his argument, although there is insufficient space here 
to do so in detail. Roughly speaking, both the social democratic parties but also new-
comers like the Green parties regularly show the isolation of the party elite from the 
members, voters, or the masses as they were called earlier. Only quite recently, the 
Labour Party elected its new leader by popular vote – and it is ironic that in Jeremy 
Corbyn the delegates chose someone who did not fit the requirements of a party 
leader propagated both by the yellow press and by political pundits.
What we can observe in nearly all European countries with a strong party on the 
moderate left is the nationalization of its personnel, accompanied by a sharp decline 
in the numbers of ordinary members. This is, of course, due to the fact that all catch-
all people’s parties have suffered severe losses in membership; to cite just the Ger-
man example, the SPD, which had around 600,000 members after the Second World 
War and in the 1950s, has declined to half a million party members and may not – 
unlike in the 1950s – realistically expect another sky-high peak of one million mem-
bers like in 1976. This is by no means a social democratic problem per se, similar 
shrinkage currently affects the conservatives (the combined CDU and CSU), who 
started from a much lower level and have never exceeded ca. 800,000.7 The decline in 
the number of party members has been even sharper in Austria. Until the late 1970s, 
the SPÖ had nearly three quarters of a million members; in 2017 it was reported that 
the number dropped below 200,000.8
The Austrian case of subsidizing parliamentary democracy is of particular inter-
est here because it exceeds all other countries. Today, all parties live primarily off 
taxpayer’s subsidies, and this applies not only at the national level: the regional and 
the local parties receive a fixed sum of Euros for each voter and, not surprisingly, 
the highest premium is given for the regional party level, which amounts to up to 
ten times the national level. Additional financial contributions go to the educational 
branch of the party, its publications and other channels. Membership fees have con-
stantly declined over the last half-century. In addition to direct funnelling into the 
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party budget, indirect financing takes the route of personnel working for the party 
but being financed by the government: parliamentary assistants, secretariats of min-
isters and other office holders, plus staff of institutions closely related to the labour 
movement such as workers’ chambers, trade union think tanks etc. In 2017, the 
SPÖ would have been able to collect a maximum of €14 million if every single party 
member had paid the regular fee (a completely unrealistic assumption). This ficti-
tious revenue is dwarfed by the much higher and real allowance the party received 
from the taxpayers: €55 million.9
To illustrate Michels’ iron law of oligarchy, we point to the social composition 
of the “political class” of Social Democrats in Austria. During the most recent par-
liamentary campaign in 2017, the SPÖ put 461 people on its list of federal candi-
dates for parliament, the Nationalrat (ultimately winning 52 seats). Each of them 
presented themselves on the ballot with some basic data, including information on 
their occupation. Not all particulars were revealing enough, but 451 of them could 
be classified according to their occupational status. None of them called themselves 
a worker or labourer!
 130 could be coded as belonging to the political class (chancellor, ministers, 
mayors, party functionaries etc.), 33 of them belonging to works councils, trade 
unions and institutions under their direct influence,
 157 white collar workers,
 65 civil servants and other employees in the public service,
 28 professionals such as MDs or lawyers,
 20 students,
 19 were self-employed and entrepreneurs, including some who most probably 
belong to the precariat,
 18 were retired and
 only 14 of the candidates listed occupations which fall under blue collar occu-
pations such as electronics technicians (2), engine drivers (3), a fire fighter, a gar-
dener, a machine fitter, a mechatronics technician, a production operator, a pro-
duction technician, a waitress, and a shop floor technician.
For the sake of fairness, we should add that a sizable number of those candidates for 
a seat in the parliament had worked in manual jobs, received their occupational trai-
ning in blue collar jobs, made their social advancement often times through their 
political career and rose above their electorate only later in their careers. According 
to data about the German SPD, older party members are overrepresented and might 
therefore include some more blue collar workers. However, the same applies to the 
Christian Democrats and even more to Die Linke.10 Besides the anecdotal character 
of these data, there is no doubt that present-day social democratic parties no lon-
ger represent anything like a labour movement, neither their elite nor their voters.
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The more political parties are on a drip feed, the less ordinary party members are 
heard. Traditional party organizations like neighbourhood associations (collecting 
dues by grassroots functionaries), party-run newspapers, recreational organizations 
for hiking, fishing or for teetotalers have disappeared without functional substitutes. 
In some ways, political parties in the early 21st century, including social democratic 
ones, bear greater resemblance to the dignitaries’ parties from the heyday of liberal-
ism in the late 19th .century: loose organizations around elected politicians striving 
for re-election. Members and voters are lumped together in one basket, approached 
only in one-way communication whose content is pre-determined by political con-
sultants who offer their services for cash. Attempts to catch up with competitors 
with regard to social media literacy were delayed, representing another instance of 
what could be called “innovation followerism”.
Connecting the party with its voters, we must mention one further decline, the 
decreasing opportunities to bind people to the party via patronage. Parties can still 
advocate particular policies in favour of their clientele, but the claim to take care of 
their pressing demands – for housing, telephone, jobs, kids’ summer vacation etc. – 
can no longer be fulfilled. One could say somewhat cynically that the good news is 
that opportunism is gone because of a lack of incentives given to them. 
A third development, which contributes to another type of decline, is the com-
position of the electorate. Social democracy started as the political arm of the labour 
movement but in the 21st century it is hard to find workers. Their share has fallen 
from nearly half the population to less than one third, and within the remaining 
workers the compositions have changed too. The traditional place of the labour 
movement, the shop floor of a large factory, has disappeared from the scene. Even if 
there are still large employers, their personnel is seldom assembled under the roof 
of one factory hall. Among the ten biggest employers in Germany, two automobile 
producers with classic assembly line production are listed, but also four supermar-
ket chains and two logistics enterprises; very similar patterns could be given for all 
highly-developed countries.
Consequently, a German survey confirms that between 2000 and 2016 the per-
centage of workers among the SPD voters dropped from 44 to 17, while at the same 
time the percentage of self-employed individuals doubled (from 3 to 7 %) and both 
white collar workers and civil servants increased.11 So the party functionaries as por-
trayed in the anecdotal evidence from Austria more or less represent their voters 
quite well. Why then the notion of the “End of Social Democracy”?
Apparently, the answer to this question depends on how one conceptualizes the 
core identity of social democracy.
While Robert Michels perceived a lack of democracy in the social democratic 
party and thus dismissed the idea of democracy altogether (and moreover turned to 
11ÖZG 29 | 2018 | 1
fascism), some focus on the programmatic writings of the party and the ideas that 
are being voiced there.
The SPD’s Bad Godesberg programme was seen by many as a reformist, softened 
version of socialism in complicity with capitalism. Karim Fertikh’s paper studies the 
genesis and reception of this programme in both Germany and France. The debates 
back then certainly saw social democracy wane with the perceived scientification of 
the authorship of the committee charged with devising the answers to society’s most 
pressing problems. However, as Fertikh demonstrates, there is far more continuity 
than change between the Marxist ideology of the Heidelberg programme and the 
Bad Godesberg programme.
Fritz Weber advocates an alternative perspective by claiming that the moder-
ate left lost the battle first during the Great Depression of the 1930s by refusing to 
adopt a Realpolitik approach. Adhering to the Marxist tradition of the imminent end 
of capitalist production hampered the formulation of a labour market policy creat-
ing jobs for the unemployed. Weber argues that it was only when the reception of 
Keynes replaced orthodox Marxist views on economic policy that social democracy 
became successful.
As Jan Hansen shows in his chapter on a later crisis of – again – the SPD, the 
alienation of the SPD party rank and file from their increasingly critical milieu in 
the discussion about the Euromissile base in Germany seems to have put an end 
to a party tradition. The new social movements appeared to outperform the social 
democrats in terms of moral authority. The party hierarchy and its reason of state 
were no more appealing; on the contrary, new forms of articulating new content and 
the cry for participation were particularly attractive to the young socialists (Jusos), 
women, and the party’s left wing. Hence for a hardliner such as Helmut Schmidt this 
must have been the end of social democracy as he steered it.
Turning to the Netherlands and Harm Kaal’s paper, the Partij van de Arbeid 
(PvdA) was faced with the criticism of embourgeoisement when it decided to follow 
a catch-all approach and modernized its campaigning strategy with the use of mass 
media and corresponding imagery of celebrity party leaders. Some activists rejected 
this course  – as to them it must have meant the end of social democracy  – and 
founded new movements (such as Nieuw Links) that particularly strove to address 
the underprivileged in society.
Two papers (Alan Granadino’s study of the Portuguese socialist party and the 
role of its leader Mario Soares and Jan de Graaf ’s all-European comparative ana-
lysis of the adoption and rejection of the shiny models of the Labour Party and the 
Scandinavian social democrats) seem to point in a different direction: what critics 
of Soares and the reformist social democratic parties regarded as a case of deflec-
tion from the pure belief in Marxism was often the result of political realism in the 
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face of an economically developing society. They acted as what the great Berlin-born 
economist Albert O. Hirschman conceptualized as “reform mongers”: “Hirschman 
proposed exploring the extensive area that lies between the traditional polarities of 
pacific reform and revolution. He thus created a scheme according to which mod-
erate reform can be approved if the reform monger manages to convince, first, the 
progressive camp that the chances of radical reforms being enacted are very slim and 
that the only choice is between the status quo and moderate reform; and, second, the 
other camp that the chances of maintaining the status quo are almost nil and that 
their only choice is between moderate reform and radical reform cum revolution.”12 
Incidentally, Hirschman’s brother-in law was the aforementioned Altiero Spinelli, 
whose political life was dedicated to building a new, more democratic, peaceful, and 
federal Europe. Under his name, a European federalist think tank presently sum-
mons European leaders of the left such as Jacques Delors, Romano Prodi, Daniel 
Cohn-Bendit, of the Liberals and the European People’s Party, to network and lobby 
for a “federal and post-national Europe, a Europe of the citizens”.13 
Perhaps the future or rebirth of social democracy lies in initiatives that transcend 
both national and ideological borders and historiography will have to look for social 
democracy in totally new guises.
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